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The Halting
Consolidation
Revolution

Despite changes in the real

I N T E N S E
D E B A T E about
consolidation that captured the real estate
industry in the mid-1990s was fueled by a
highly plausible and persuasive economic
argument: real estate, like other capitalintensive industries, was in the first stage
of a long-run industry transformation that
would prove inevitable (if not unstoppable) because long-term comparative
advantages would accrue to those players
operating with the lowest cost of capital,
best access to capital, and most efficient
operations based on cost economies of
scale relative to competitors. This argument, put forth by Peter Linneman and
others, predicted a major shift to public
ownership and a corresponding focus on

T H E

estate industry, there are
many stumbling blocks to
major consolidation.
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the evolution of true corporate-style operating businesses that could command premium valuations based on their valueadded management capacity. The consolidation argument forecast that small, less
efficient REITs would disappear through
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), an
organic market-driven process by which
the surviving real estate companies would
be defined by size dominance. The intense
REIT bull market of 1994–1997 appeared
to support the hypothesis, as did a wave
of M&A activity during 1997–1998.
Implicitly, if not explicitly, the message was
bigger is better—until the complications
of execution added shading and nuance to
the prevailing logic.
The logic of consolidation applied to
real estate begged the question of whether
real estate is sufficiently different from
other capital-intensive industries to foil the
inevitability of an industrial transformation. Bernard Winograd argued in this
journal (“You Say You Want Revolution,”
WRER Fall 2000) that the revolution
stalled precisely because real estate
remained tied to a historical dependence
on debt capital, whereas the logic of consolidation presumes a ruling role for equity capital. Other kinks that were likely to
interfere with a smooth transformation
included: a noisy debate about the right
measure of depreciation in real estate; continued questions about real estate’s true
volatility and the changing nature of risk

in real estate investing; and real estate’s
contribution to portfolio diversification.
All these issues were of critical concern to
institutional investors whose acceptance of
REITs as a complement to (if not a substitute for) direct investment in their real
estate portfolios has always been viewed as
critical to the development of a public real
estate equities market.
The past decade of experience added
other questions to the consolidation argument. The benefits of economies of scale,
for example, might be a function of
achieving critical mass, after which larger
REIT size triggers diseconomies of scale.
There may well be value in being large, but
the question is how large? Similarly, from a
diversification perspective, there may be
value in establishing a presence in several
geographic markets, but as those local
property markets increase in number, so
do the risks of managing widely dispersed
operations. In short, size becomes a factor
that must be managed with increasing
people-based systems, managerial skill,
and strategic sophistication.
So, with the hindsight of a decade, let’s
assess the record. To begin, consolidation is
an empirical issue. What does the empirical evidence on economies of scale and
public ownership penetration suggest?
What can we learn from the analyses to
date, and how do these insights modify the
logic or add to our understanding of the
transforming forces that have already
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reshaped the industry? The late-1990s
REIT bear market evidenced the type of
capital-raising vulnerability that should
have made conditions ripe for M&A activity, friendly or otherwise. That was the
expectation expressed in the popular press
as well as in trade journals. As measured by
the number of publicly-traded equity
REITs, the industry shrank by about 15
percent from a high of 178 in 1995 to 151
by 2001; during the same period, the average size of an equity REIT grew significantly from $280 million to $974 million
(Figure 1). Yet the real estate industry did
not consolidate in terms of pricing power
or market share. What factors confounded
the logic of opportunity? One answer
seems rooted in the institutional dynamics
surrounding changes in corporate control.

While compelling economic and business
logic provided fertile and necessary conditions for consolidation, M&A experience
during the 1990s suggests that the forces
of consolidation in the public arena faced
well-known institutional hurdles that
raised the bar on execution.
To date the evidence on consolidation is
preliminary and ambiguous. Nevertheless,
it suggests that at this stage of the process
the metrics for assessing the potency of
consolidation forces may have less to do
with absolute measures of dominance and
more to do with how the public markets
have forever changed the rules of real
estate. There is as well a strong message
about the institutional complexities of
transition from one state of industry structure to another.

Figure I Equity REIT Market Capitalization Outstanding: 1991–2001

Year End

Number

Market
Capitalization
(millions)

1991

86

$ 8,786

$102

1992

89

11,171

126

1993

135

26,082

193

1994

175

38,812

222

1995

178

49,913

280

1996

166

78,302

472

1997

176

127,825

726

1998

173

126,905

734

1999

167

118,233

708

2000

158

134,431

851

2001

151

147,092

974

Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
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Average
Size
(millions)

SCHOLARLY

SKEPTICISM

Prior to 1990, the research literature on
REITs was both short on quantity and
narrow in focus. The small size of the
REIT market, the limited scope of property representation, and a near-total absence
of institutional investors made this
research arena too small, too specialized,
and too atypical to attract many academic
researchers. REITs were of particular interest to a few researchers only because those
provisions of the IRS code that made for
their tax-advantaged status—mandated
payouts, for example—also made the
investment vehicle a natural experimental
control for exploring certain questions of
importance to corporate finance.
The development of a larger, more
deeply capitalized REIT market representative of a broader slice of the universe
of the income-producing property sector
changed that condition. Data on commercial real estate, hitherto proprietary
and the bane of much real estate investment research effort was now readily
available. With the inclusion of institutional-grade property assets, the scope of
generalization on a significant range of
research issues—capital structure, dividend policy, taxes and share prices,
investment performance, management
focus, alignment and conflicts of interest,
industry structure—expanded significantly. In short, by going public, real

estate broadened the long-term prospects
of probing academic research.
Several studies of concentration, merger activity, and scale economies appeared in
scholarly and practitioner journals.
Stimulated by the controversy, these studies
sought an immediate empirical read on the
arguments of the consolidation debate, as
some of the more skeptical titles suggested:
“The Great REIT Consolidation: Fact or
Fancy?” and “REIT Economies of Scale:
Fact or Fiction?” Taken as a set, the research
sought to determine whether observable
rapid growth of the REIT sector over the
decade actually resulted in greater concentration within the real estate industry;
whether economies of scale related to size
(expense cost savings, higher quality or professional management), branding, or geographic concentration (informational efficiencies, monopoly pricing power) actually
exist for REITs; whether larger REITs actually benefited from such cost efficiencies;
and whether meaningful differences in
managerial ability actually make consolidation economically valuable. The empirical
findings are mixed:
Concentration: Despite dramatic growth
in the size of the average equity REIT and
increasing merger and acquisition activity
during the 1990s, there is no strong and
unambiguous evidence of a sweeping
trend toward consolidation. Measured in
terms of penetration by public-market
ownership, by year-end 2000, the share of
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the investable commercial real estate universe owned by public companies had
actually declined from its peak; this data
point represented the first contraction in
public ownership for five of the six major
property types (the exception being the
apartment sector, which experienced a
decline the year earlier), marking a reversal
of an earlier upward trajectory for public
ownership.
Wealth-enhancing merger gains: Nearly
two out of three of the equity REIT mergers between 1994 and 1997 produced negative returns for REIT acquirers (unless
they were paired-share tax-structure acquisitions) in the immediate days following
the announcement, indicating that these
managers generally failed to capture valueenhancements for their shareholders.
While the acquired equity REITs registered positive returns, they significantly
underperformed compared to their nonREIT counterparts.
Cost economies: Evidence of cost
economies exists, primarily in the area of
general and administrative expenses and
management fees, but these are the smallest
components of total REIT costs, making
for a small potential impact on performance. Moreover, the research found that for
G&A expenses little variation exists across
REIT size, while for management fees, diseconomies appear with larger asset size.
NOI growth and scale economies:
Enhanced ability to grow rental income by
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strategic asset acquisitions and higherquality and professional management does
not appear to be related to size. Contrary
to the large-REIT hypothesis, an analysis
of twenty-one apartment-focused REITs
(between 1994 and 1997) failed to reveal
evidence that large REITs have higher
NOI growth rates, but rather the just
opposite: in the apartment sector, small
REITs appear to generate higher NOI
growth rates relative to large REITs.
Branding and scale economies: While
establishing a brand image affords marketing advantages and offers significant
returns in other capital-intensive, service-oriented industries, this does not
appear to be the case for multifamily
REITs. In particular, there is no evidence
that REITs with a branding strategy generate higher income growth rates relative
to the market.
Geographic concentration and scale
economies: There is no support for pricing
power (evidenced in higher income
growth rates) arising from geographic
concentration, at least within the REIT
apartment sector. While geographic concentration might allow larger REITs to
dominate smaller REITs by achieving
informational efficiencies with respect to
pricing (or by attracting top management
talent able to choose strong markets), this
potential is undercut by REITs’ controlling relatively low market shares in any
one market.

These academic studies suggest that
size alone does not confer advantage. This
conclusion offers ambiguous evidence. To
the contrarians, it indicates that the central
tenet of the consolidation argument was
faulty. To those who contend that the
transformation will take several decades,
these preliminary findings, based on only a
very modest level of research, cannot possibly settle the issue: the revolution is still
young. I believe that the jury is still out.
Much more time needs to pass and more
information is needed to assess the question of whether or not economies of scale
and meaningful differences in managerial
ability actually make consolidation economically valuable. In the meantime, a
number of factors have complicated the
path toward consolidation.

MANAGING

SIZE

One of the early lessons from consolidation activity is that the cost-of-capital
advantage, while logically necessary for any
capital-intensive industry, is not sufficient
to establish a sustainable competitive
advantage in the real estate industry (at
least not in a REIT format, where turning
properties under a capital-allocation strategy is comparatively difficult to execute).
Size is important for a number of reasons,
but size alone cannot bring on efficiencies.
Capital needs to command not just effi-

ciencies, but operational excellence at both
the property and corporate level in order
to deliver what the public market
demands: predictable, sustainable earnings
along with growth. Size may allow larger
REITs to attract higher quality and professional management, which by implication
may make them better positioned to
acquire properties and position them for
superior income growth, but that too is
not sufficient. Assuring revenue productivity from existing operations while managing the transitions inherent in asset growth
through substantial mergers and acquisitions of companies and portfolios depends
on the development of a strong corporate
infrastructure of sophisticated business systems. It demands an operational efficiency
that goes beyond, for example, the elimination of redundant general and administrative costs. When major multibilliondollar REITs merge, as in the case of
Equity Office Properties and Boston
Properties, or Archstone and Charles E.
Smith Residential, overheads are not so
large relative to these companies’ assets.
Moreover, the personnel issues and ongoing costs of blending companies can
swamp even these one-time cost savings.
The platform for the type of competitive advantage that underlies the logic of
consolidation, as applicable to the real
estate industry, implies a management
model capable of forging a company culture that can be responsive to the demands
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of two distinct sets of business dynamics:
entrepreneurial sales and corporate discipline. It must be capable of blending both
behavior sets, which mirror the dual character of real estate as both a physical product transacted in local property markets
and an investment asset transacted in
national (global) capital markets. It must
cultivate the type of entrepreneurial management necessary to succeed at the product level in local markets, which are small
and where tenants needs are often unique
to that market. It must also build business
systems of corporate focus and discipline
necessary to aggressively manage the asset
portfolio, maintain a strong balance sheet,
and extract marginal efficiencies at the
operating level. Creating shareholder value
in this manner requires that vision marry
discipline in a new format distinctively tailored to the real estate business, which cannot elude its highly localized character.
Not unexpectedly perhaps, consolidation as measured by the level of publicmarket ownership penetration (in data
published by Prudential Real Estate
Investors) is greatest in those product sectors where the character of the tenant
market is least localized and the contracts
for space less likely to be single, one-off
transactions: regional malls (34.1 percent)
and hotels (17.1 percent). The tenant
markets for regional malls, dominated by
department stores and chain-store tenants
and those for investment-grade hotels
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catering to business and recreational travelers, are large and national in scope.
Multiple transactions with the same tenants are the norm, as are package negotiations. These markets seem to be the ones
most suited to the type of economies of
scale, branding, pricing power, and informational networks that have characterized consolidation of other consumeroriented capital-intensive sectors. In the
absence of new management models that
are focused on the development of people, business systems, and company culture, executing the strategy of scale to
apartment, office, and warehouse sectors
where tenant markets are more localized
is likely to remain a significant challenge
to the logic of consolidation.
The real estate industry’s embedded
entrepreneurial culture is both an asset and
a constraint in this task. In a deal-oriented
industry of hard-driving entrepreneurs,
the corporate style has been a rare exception, until recently. “Style makeovers,”
Winograd wrote, “were reasonably common among those who aspired to change
from a mobilizer of debt to a mobilizer of
public equity capital, and industry leaders
emerged to prominence who would have
been much less conspicuous in the old
environment.” It may take the next generation of entrepreneurial-minded yet corporate-trained leadership, CEOs who did
not privately operate the asset portfolios
they built from scratch, to forge the new

management model that possesses all the
tools needed to push forward the next
stage of consolidation.

THE

MARKET
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During a sector slowdown, the forces driving the logic of consolidation intensify.
Flat performance, weak stock prices, and
minimal prospects for growth make access
to equity capital nearly impossible for
REITs, which have minimal discretion to
retain earnings and must pay out 90 percent of net income. The capital divide
between strong and weak companies
becomes most acute, and prospects for
growth stall. Stable performance at the
property level at best affords few resources
for a public company to do much more
than manage operations. Facing low multiples and an inability to raise equity
because of a depressed stock price, while
simultaneously being at or close to the
market’s tolerance ceiling on debt, makes
for limited horizons in terms of the creation of shareholder value. If management
frustration with just operating the asset
base becomes sufficiently high, it might
provide the catalyst for a sale. But, it might
not. Weak REITs can survive, management can continue to draw financially
rewarding compensation and maintain
other benefits of control, and shareholders

can continue to receive dividends (assuming adequate funds from operations).
Modest acquisitions can be funded
through selective property dispositions
and, under the appropriate market conditions, development commenced and offbalance sheet joint ventures pursued.
Though alive, these weakened companies
are not viewed as survivors, and when selling at substantial discounts to perceived
net asset values, they become obvious candidates for consolidation. The dynamic of
stalled growth drives the potential opportunity: for both private and public players,
it may be cheaper to buy a REIT than it
would be to buy real estate direct.
Figure II Number of Completed Public Real Estate
Company Mergers: 1992–2001

Year

Merger
Announcements

1992

0

1993

0

1994

2

1995

5

1996

7

1997

14

1998

18

1999

8

2000

6

2001

8

Total

68

Includes all announced, completed
mergers in which the acquiring firm and
the target were public real estate property
companies; 54 are equity REIT-to-equity
REIT combinations.
Source: Lehman Brothers.
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Consolidation within the public real
estate company sector did in fact accelerate
during a four-year period between 1997
and 2000, when 46 public companies
were absorbed in mergers (Figure 2). The
overlay with the REIT bear market is not
exact, however. Merger announcements
tapered off notably in 1999 and 2000,
years in which the number of secondary
equity offerings, unsecured debt offerings,
and initial equity offerings among REITs
were a fraction of the strong activity
recorded in 1997 and 1998 for each of
these forms of capital raising. Public companies continued to consolidate through
acquisitions of private real estate firms in
1997 and 1998, but this M&A activity
nearly disappeared in 1999 and 2000;
activity picked up only slightly in 2001
and 2002. Toward the end of 1998, the
pendulum swung toward privatization,
with the announcements of investor
groups taking two public real estate companies private. In the next three years,
eight other equity REITs would disappear

from the public sector through privatization (see Figure 3 for aggregate data on
public company real estate mergers).
Judging from the pronouncements in
trade journals and the media at the time,
the stage was set for great consolidation.
Wall Street analysts and investor groups
prepared lists of takeover candidates.
Other industry observers anticipated an
increase in hostile takeover attempts.
There was a lot of talk about potential
combinations, but little activity. Mergers
occurred, but they often failed to generate
big premiums for investors. No unfriendly
merger activity succeeded during the late1990s REIT bear market, though two hostile attempts failed.
Does the lack of hostile deals suggest a
failure of the takeover market, as might be
suggested by the analogy with corporate
finance, which regards hostile takeovers as
a necessary tool to discipline managers?
Or is this missing element another manifestation of how real estate might differ
from other capital-intensive industries?

Figure III Public Company Real Estate Mergers by Type of Merger: 1997–2002 (June)

Type of Merger

Number

Total Rank Value
(millions)

Public acquiring Public

53

$81,085

Public acquiring Private

36

$29,828

Private acquiring Public

15

$20,064

104

$130,978

Total

Includes all announced, completed mergers over $250 million in which the acquiring
firm or the target was a public real estate property company, equity REIT or C-corp.
Source: Lehman Brothers.
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For a number of financial and institutional
reasons, hostile takeovers of public real
estate companies are difficult and complex, if not impossible.
On the institutional side, the REIT
excess-share-ownership provision is often
cited as special legal protection and a key
inhibitor of hostile actions, a built-in antitakeover safeguard, because a would-be
acquirer cannot build a meaningful ownership position. Typically adopted as a part
of a REIT’s articles of incorporation, the
excess-share-ownership provision usually
restricts the number of shares that any
shareholder can own to 9.8 percent or
some lesser provision (to empower management to enforce the 5/50 rule of the
IRS Code, which prohibits five or fewer
individuals from owning in the aggregate
more than 50 percent of the REIT), and
thereby ostensibly serves to protect the
company’s tax-advantaged status. The conventional wisdom on this point is not firm,
however. While the excess-share-ownership
provision puts in place a hurdle, M&A
attorneys David M. Einhorn, Adam O.
Emmerich, and Robin Panovka have
argued that, in practice, REITs appear no
less vulnerable to unsolicited takeovers
than other public companies. The excessshare limitation does not make a REIT
“bulletproof.” At best it serves as no more
protection than a “poison pill” and, in
many instances, it is more vulnerable to
attack than a “pill” because the excess-

share-ownership provision has not been
tested in the courts (unlike poison pills, for
which there are legal precedents). The hostile attempt by Manufactured Home
Communities (MHC) for Chateau
Properties, which had announced a friendly merger with ROC Communities in
mid-1996, came close to testing this provision in court, but after a series of moves
among the contending parties that ultimately resulted in the merger of Chateau
and ROC (though not before ROC sweetened its offer by more than 3 percent to
avert a shareholder revolt), MHC withdrew its hostile bid later that year.
The lesson was not lost on REIT managers and boards when the downturn hit
in 1998. To protect themselves against
unwanted takeovers and inadequate bids,
some forty-seven REITs adopted poison
pills between January 1998 and May
1999. Since the board of directors has the
right to waive the excess-share-ownership
provision, or a pill for that matter, in practical terms, both function to almost eliminate the ability to buy a target without
negotiating with its management or board.
“Bear hugs” such as Public Storage, Inc.’s
bid for Storage Trust Realty in 1998,
which finally resulted in a definitive transaction, are more likely, according to M&A
specialists.
The tax-related impediment associated with change of control actions brought
to the fore in MHC’s bid for Chateau
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highlighted the ways in which a takeover
target with an UPREIT structure has an
additional means to thwart or deter a
takeover. To protect the tax position of
contributing partners, UPREIT operatingpartnership agreements sometimes give
OP unit-holders the right to veto certain
transactions. The existence of veto rights,
as well as put rights that OP unit-holders
generally have, strongly suggests that the
tax issues generated in a potential merger
transaction may be a bigger constraint on
a hostile bid than the excess-share ownership provision. Thus, hostile offers for
REITs involve layers of additional complexity not associated with other public
companies.
The major impediment to unsolicited
takeovers in the REIT arena has been a
perceived inability to justify the type of
premium that would be required in a hostile takeover. The premium paid by Equity
Office Properties for Beacon Properties
Corporation (40 percent over asset value
and 22 percent over stock price) did not
become the turning point in REIT merger
pricing that some expected, but rather an
exception to prevailing practice. As a collection of properties, real estate is reasonably straightforward to price. It has relatively fixed income streams and operating
expenses, especially if the assets are fully or
near fully leased and years away from substantial rollovers. Unlike a manufacturing
company where there may be unpriced
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capacity or a financial-services firm where
there may be many synergies from a merger, for a REIT target it is hard to justify
paying a price much above the estimated
value of the underlying properties. If
economies of scale existed, it would be
possible to justify a large premium. But
typically the present value of the anticipated economies is not large. If the bid premium were large enough, many boards
would ultimately agree to a sale, as their
fiduciary responsibility would demand
that they do so. But if in offering a large
premium the market perceives the buyer
has overpaid, the buyer will be quickly disciplined. Companies need to be selling at
very sizable discounts to net asset value for
the hostile equation to work in practice.
Other items add dead weight to the
financial calculus. Unfriendly takeovers are
expensive to mount as well as uncertain.
To the extent that the weakest target companies are also small, several million dollars
of expenses for an acquisition whose outcome isn’t clear (especially if a proxy battle
gets under way) becomes an expensive way
of acquiring assets that initially were
considered cheap. In other words, it is prohibitively costly in the REIT world to do
anything that is unfriendly. A final important takeover impediment distinguishes the
real estate industry. Unlike other capitalintensive industries, there is a large private
market, which, as past cycles have shown,
can and will arbitrage significant pricing

differentials between the public and private sides of real estate.
“One of the reasons industry evolutions take so long,” Linneman asserted in
his 1997 Wharton Real Estate Review article, “is that it takes several periods of
industry distress to fully shake out the
weakest operators.” Based on the merger
evidence to date, this caveat on expectations seems exceptionally appropriate.
Evidence of continual merger activity,
friendly or otherwise, is an essential thread
of the consolidation argument. Yet in an
industry as splintered and diverse as real
estate, even in mergers of multibilliondollar companies, no one company
emerges with dominance and pricing
power. While M&A activity on both the
public and private sides of the market is
clear evidence that consolidation continues to take place, relative to the size of the
investment-grade commercial real estate
universe, the overall impact on the structure of the industry, especially at the level of
the local property market, remains small.
There is widespread consensus about
the manner in which the public market
has changed the rules of the real estate
business. Greater transparency, fuller disclosure, and ongoing monitoring of public
real estate companies have increased the
informational efficiency in both local
space and national asset markets.
Ironically, the heightened scrutiny of public companies in the post-Enron era is

likely to be more of an immediate drag on
private-to-public activity. With the public
debt market as a price setter, greater discipline in lending exists through fast and visible spread adjustments pegged to global
capital markets. And the continued existence of a large private market for real
estate capital continues to provide opportunities for capital-market arbitrage. A
different world from ten years ago, for
sure: more complex, more challenging,
and also more interesting.

Lehman Brothers graciously supplied the merger information
for this paper, which was also aided by conversations with
Matthew Lustig and David Sherman and research assistance by
Ylan Kunstler.
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